Evidence -- Privileged Communications -- The New North Carolina Priest-Penitent Statute by Taylor, Thomas W.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 46 | Number 2 Article 12
2-1-1968
Evidence -- Privileged Communications -- The
New North Carolina Priest-Penitent Statute
Thomas W. Taylor
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas W. Taylor, Evidence -- Privileged Communications -- The New North Carolina Priest-Penitent Statute, 46 N.C. L. Rev. 427 (1968).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol46/iss2/12
PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
an employer-employee privilege.'5 How then can a privilege be
justified between a management services consultant and a corporate
client?
In the report of the American Bar Association's Committee on
the Improvement of the Law of Evidence in 1937-38,26 the com-
mittee recommended a strict application of existing privileges and
recommended against further recognition of so called "novel privi-
leges." Since that date several jurisdictions have failed to heed
these recommendations. Most of the statutes noted above have
been enacted since 1938. The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants has not adopted a position either in favor of
or in opposition to the privilege since it may be detrimental to the
profession's interest.2 7  State C.P.A. societies are not affiliated
with the Institute and it is these societies that sponsor privilege
legislation. However, legislators are faced with the realities that
the privilege is (a) virtually useless in the area of taxation, (b) of
negligible benefit, and possibly a hindrance, to the effectiveness of
the audit function, and (c) unwarranted as to management consul-
tants. The benefits gained by the accountant-client relation due
to the privilege are slight, and do not exceed on balance the
injury that would inure to the effective administration of justice.
HAROLD N. BYNUM
Evidence-Privileged Communications-The New North
Carolina Priest-Penitent Statute
In 1967 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a new
priest-penitent' privilege statute.2 The statute is the second of its
WIGMO a § 2286.
263 ABA REP. 570, 595 (1938).
, Letter from Timothy T. McCaffrey, state legislation Manager, AICPA,
to Harold N. Bynum, Sept. 14, 1967.
' Usage of the term "priest-penitent" is common as a characterization of
the relationship which exists between any clergyman of any religious faith
and one who receives his professional aid. 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 263 (1957).
One of the most liberal extensions of this group to whom the privilege is
applied is found in Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290
(1917), in which admissions of fornication by a young woman before a
Presbyterian body of elders were held a confidential communication.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.1 (1967):
No priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner, or a
clergyman or ordained minister of an established church shall be
competent to testify in any action, suit or proceeding concerning any
1968]
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kind passed in North Carolina, the first having been enacted in 1959
and amended in 1963. a Aside from the interesting fact that the
former statute was substantially altered only eight years after its
enactment, the changes in at least three important respects reveal
with greater clarity the present status of the privilege in this state.
It is the purpose of this note to discuss the changes made and their
effects, and to comment upon problems left unresolved.
First, the requirement that the communicant object to the testi-
mony of the clergyman was removed to make the privilege more
absolute.4 Under the former statute an objection by the communi-
cant was required to evoke the privilege, and a failure to object was
interpreted as a waiver of the privilege.6 As a practical matter this
means that the jury may be less prejudiced in that the court, rather
than the communicant, calls forth the testimonial immunity. But
it does not necessarily follow that the privilege exists apart from its
benefit to the communicant, for he alone can waive the privilege.6
Assuming that it exists for the benefit of the communicant alone,
then clearly it cannot be claimed by the priest to protect himself
once it has been waived.
Only in open court can the privilege be waived. An express
rather than an implied waiver seems to be favored, but the latter
information which was communicated to him and entrusted to
him in his professional capacity, and necessary to enable him to dis-
charge the functions of his office according to the usual course of
his practice or discipline, wherein such person so communicating
such information about himself or another is seeking spiritual counsel
and advice relative to and growing out of the information so imparted,
provided, however, that this section shall not apply where communi-
cant in open court waives the privilege conferred.
' N.C. SEss. LAWS 1959, c. 646, as amended, 1963, c. 200:
No clergyman, ordained minister, priest, rabbi, or accredited
Christian Science practitioner of an established church or religious
organization shall be required to testify in any action, suit, or pro-
ceeding, concerning any information which may have been confi-
dentially communicated to him in his professional capacity under
such circumstances that to disclose the information would violate a
sacred or moral trust, when the giving of such testimony is objected
to by the communicant; provided, that the presiding judge in any
trial may compel such disclosure if in his opinion the same is necessary
to a proper administration of justice.
'"There is a limited number of statutory privileges. They are absolute
in the sense that, even in matters involving public justice, a court may not
compel disclosure of confidential communications thus made privileged."
People v. Keating, 286 App. Div. 150, 152, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562, 565 (1955).
Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 Onio ST. L.J.
55, 78 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Reese].6 Id.
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may properly be found where the communicant testifies "concern-
ing what transpired at confession." 7  With regard to the other usual
methods of waiver,' it is certain that a statement by the communi-
cant would suffice. It is less certain that a signed affidavit would
meet this test and practically indisputable that an out-of-court stip-
ulation by the parties would be insufficient to constitute waiver.9
Second, the provision by which the judge could compel dis-
closure when necessary in his opinion to the proper administration of
justice was omitted from the new statute. It is likely that this pro-
vision for compulsory disclosure was originally included in the
old statute because of the similar provision in the physician-patient
privilege statute.10 There is, however, greater justification for such
a power where the privilege is primarily evoked in litigation in-
volving life insurance policies and misrepresentations of health, cor-
poreal injuries and their extent, and testimentary dispositions and
the issue of mental capacity.'1 In litigation involving the priest-peni-
tent privilege there are few cases in which the "only evidence against
a defendant is his confession to a clergyman."' Moreover, doubt has
been expressed that the "existence" of the privilege is a potent factor
in the exclusion of relevant testimony since "it would be a poor priest
or clergyman that would reveal confidential confessions and an
even poorer prosecutor who would insist upon it."'" Appreciation
for the omission of this discretionary power is enhanced when one
considers that the trial judge's discretion "would be final because
the only possible ground for review would have to be whether it
'was in his opinion' and even the most ingenious logician could
'Id. at 79. Concerning the physician-patient privilege, the court, in
Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 23, 116 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1960), said that
waiver is "by implication where the patient calls the physician as a witness
and examines him as to patient's physical condition, . . . or . . . testifies
to the communication between himself and physician."
' Reese at 79.
'This conclusion follows from analysis of the provision stating that the
statute will not apply only "where communicant in open court waives the
privilege conferred." Statute cited note 2 supra. [Emphasis added].
10 See 38 N.C.L. REv. 190, 191 (1960). For the physician-patient privi-
lege statute, as a means of comparison, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953).
" Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 38, 125 S.E.2d
326, 331 (1962). A definite "finding appearing of record," Creech v.
Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 211 N.C. 658, 191 S.E. 840 (1937), was necessary
to show that compulsory testimony was required by the "ends of justice," Yow
v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84 S.E.2d 297 (1954).1 27 IND. L.J. 256, 267 (1952).
" Quick, Privileges Under the Uniform Rides of Evidence, 26 U. Cin.
L. Rav. 537, 545 (1957).
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hardly make 'his opinion' reviewable before an appellate court."' 4
Divestment of the discretionary power gets the judge "off the
hook" in uncomfortable cases because he realizes that any decision
to compel a clergyman to testify is likely to result not only in con-
tempt proceedings and imprisonment but also in marshalling public
opinion in the clergyman's favor.r
Third, the description of the confidential communication reflects
broadened conditions under which the privilege may be claimed.
The unswerving persuasion of the clergyman as to his professional
obligations and responsibilities " is reflected in the liberal terms in
which the new privilege statute was enacted. Any information
communicated and entrusted to him in his professional capacity
and necessary for him to discharge his official functions is to be
regarded as incompetent testimony.17  Thus it appears that the in-
tent of the General Assembly was not to limit the communication to
a confession of sins alone, the privileged status of which would
depend upon the "confession" requirements of a particular church.18
Rather, the type of information to which the privilege extends is
explicated by the paradoxically broadening limitation that the
"person so communicating such information about himself or
another is seeking spiritual counsel and advice relative to and grow-
ing out of the information so imparted."'" However, there is no
requirement that the claimant be a member of the congregation or
church which the minister serves.20 Under this broadened coverage
it would seem that information obtained during marriage counseling
or reconciliation sessions with a clergyman would be accorded the
privilege."' It is less certain that the privilege is applicable to in-
1" Reese at 76.
1 Reese at 60-61.
" For the attitude typical of most clergymen when faced with the dilemma
requiring a choice of either testifying or facing contempt of court pro-
ceedings, see Greensboro Daily News, June 19, 1966, § D, at 12, col. 1-8, and
lit re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 70-72, 152 S.E.2d 317, 319-321 (1967).
'" Statute cited note 2 supra.
'
8 See In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 604, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (1931).
19 Statute cited note 2 supra.2 0Kohloff v. Bronx Savings Bank, 37 Misc.2d 27, 233 N.Y.S.2d 849 (New
York City Civ. Ct. 1962).
" Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 29 Misc.2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct.
1961). The decision was under a statute similar to that of North Carolina.
Such information has been denied the privilege under a dissimilar statute
limiting "confessions" to those in the "course of discipline enjoined by the
church." Although the statute was said not to have provided the privilege
(Vol. 46
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formation in the records of a church-related agency.2 2 While North
Carolina is avowedly a "strict constructionist"' ' of privilege stat-
utes, the court has extended the physician-patient privilege to certain
hospital records24 so that an analogous extension of the priest-peni-
tent privilege would not be without precedent.
Although the new statute is instructive in regard to many pre-
viously unanswered questions about the privilege in North Caroline,
it is no panacea. At least two primary questions, for example,
were left unresolved in In re Williams,2 5 which is believed to have
had a catalytic effect on the recent statute.26
The first-and less difficult-question was whether the superior
court was correct in holding that "any testimony from [the minis-
ter] concerning any conversation he might have had with the de-
fendant"27 would be recognized as a privileged communication. In
regard to this question it should be remembered that under the new
statute the communication must have reference to the giving of
spiritual counsel, aid, or advice.2 Therefore, testimony concerning
"any conversation" is too broad a classification for application of
the privilege. Casual or friendly conversation unrelated to the above
as to marriage counseling, the court managed to find a privilege in a pre-
conference agreement with the rabbi. Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal.App.2d
90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1965).
22 State v. Lender, 266 Minn. 561, 124 N.W.2d 355 (1963) (no allegation
of confession of unwed mother).
"' Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 37, 125, S.E.2d
326, 331 (1962).2
'Id.
269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967). This is the only case concerning
the former priest-penitent statute to reach the Supreme Court. The privilege
was raised as a collateral matter in a criminal prosecution in the superior
court when Williams, a Baptist minister called as a witness by both the
state and the defendant, refused to be sworn as a witness or to testify as
to his observations while in the home of the defendant. Upon the defendant's
objection the court ruled that testimony concerning any conversation between
the defendant and Williams, his minister, would be a privileged communica-
tion. But the defendant did not object to testimony concerning Williams'
observations and the court held Williams in contempt of court for his refusal
to answer a question concerning what he had seen. The case was dealt
with on appeal by construing the statute strictly according to the procedural
requirement of an objection by the communicant for the testimony to be
incompetent.
2 For an overview of some of the factors which brought about the
statutory change, see Finlator, "Resolution to be Presented to the Baptist
State Convention of North Carolina Meeting in Winston Salem, November
14, 1966."22 269 N.C. at 71, 152 S.E.2d at 320. [Emphasis added].
28 See State v. Brown, 95 Iowa 381, 64 N.W. 277 (1895).
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purposes cannot be said to fall within the protection of the privi-
lege.29
More difficult is the complex question of whether an observation
of a clergyman incident to a privileged communication is also privi-
leged "information" within the meaning of the statute. Generally
a statute creating a privilege against disclosure of a confidential
communication "has been construed to include observations, as well
as communications."" °  Since the statute includes "any" informa-
tion, there is no reason to exclude from the definition of informa-
tion those observations "communicated" to the priest in the course
of spiritual counseling. Such observations would circumscribe the
acts of the communicant, his general attitude and his personal ap-
pearance. These are necessary concomitants of the intimate face-
to-face nature of counseling. At least one state has provided by
statute that clergymen are under no duty to report a communicant's
gunshot wound to law enforcement officials if such a report would
violate a confidential communication."1
This conclusion, however, does not answer the question of
whether observations concerning persons or subjects other than the
communicant are to be accorded the privilege. One may argue that
were it not for the purpose of receiving privileged information the
clergyman would not have been in a position to make such an obser-
vation. Thus it would follow that the privileged information should
include the observations which otherwise would not have been
made. The difficulty with this argument is that it has been extended
beyond its practical limitations. It is analogous in this respect to
the "but for" theory of proximate cause restrictions which do not
allow one involved in an automobile accident to be assessed with fault
merely because had he not been driving the accident would not
have occurred.
But the above argument-while invalid in its application to third
parties or subjects having no personal connection with the communi-
cant-may well apply to those persons or things immediately in-
" See Angleton v. Angleton, 84 Idaho 77, 370 P.2d 788 (1962) which
held not privileged remarks during conversations in course of friendly meet-ings.ig See Boyles v. Cora, 232 Iowa 822, 841, 6 N.W.2d 401, 410 (1942); cf.
Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind.App. 362, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950), where it
was held that personal observations not involving a confession enjoined by
the church are admissible (observation as to soundness of mind of grantor
of deed).
" 0HIO REv. CODE § 2917.44 (1961).
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volved with either the communicant or the communication in a
manner similar to his personal appearance. The logic of the privi-
lege seems to require inclusion of this latter type of observation
within privileged information. If it did not, for example, the effect
of the privilege as to testimony concerning the penitent's admissions
of thefts would certainly be vitiated by subsequent testimony of the
priest that he saw the stolen goods. Thus it is clear that formula-
tion of comprehensive rules dealing with varying factual situations
must await case by case development of more specific privilege prin-
ciples.
The new statute embodies the recognition by the General Assem-
bly that the purpose of the former statute could be better served by
broadening the terms defining the privilege. The new statute fol-
lows a trend among state legislatures to liberalize the priest-penitent
privilege32 and should be well received by the clergy and the Bar.
Such a direction clearly conforms to the basic policy underlying the
priest-privilege that
Knowledge so acquired in the performance of a spiritual
function . . . is not to be transformed into evidence to be given
to the whole world. . . . The benefit of preserving these confi-
dences inviolate overbalances the possible benefit of permitting
litigation to prosper at the expense of the . . . spiritual rehabili-
tation of a penitent. The rules of evidence have always been
concerned not only with truth but with the manner of its ascer-
tainmenta3
THOMAS W. TAYLOR
Insurance-The "Other Insurance" Clause Conflict
The controversy among the courts concerning conflicting "other
insurance" clauses1 in automobile liability policies is no small one.
This conflict arises when two policies appear to provide general
coverage to a driver, yet each claims exclusion from liability. That
claim is generally based on provisions in each stating either that
" North Carolina was among the twelve states in which priest-penitent
statutes were enacted during the five-year period, 1957-1962. There has been
no apparent abuse of the privilege, evidenced by the fact that no state has
ever repealed its statute once it was adopted. Reese at 58.
" Mullen v. U.S., 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
1 "Other insurance" clauses are "clauses which purport to vary the cov-
erage of the policy if there is another policy or other policies protecting the
risk insured against." Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502, 503 (1961).
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